Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 12
Number 2 Spring

Article 3

January 1983

The Treaty Power of the European Economic Community
Paul B. van Son

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
Paul B. van Son, The Treaty Power of the European Economic Community, 12 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 183
(1983).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

ARTICLES

The Treaty Power of the
European Economic Community
PAUL B. VAN SON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The European Economic Community (EEC)1 has increasingly exercised its power to act on the international scene as an equal with sovereign nation states. This phenomenon is an acknowledgement of the European Community's international personality' and its ability to negotiate
*Paul B. van Son is a Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Department of State, assigned to the American Embassy in London. B.A. 1971, Eckerd College; J.D. (cum laude)
1979, Stetson University College of Law; L.L.M. in international law, 1981, University of
Miami. Mr. van Son is a member of the Florida and American Bars.
1. The terms European Economic Community, European Community, Community and
EEC will be used interchangeably in this paper. The EEC was established in 1958 by the
Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom, Mar.
25, 1952, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) (as amended through 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Rome Treaty, Treaty of Rome or Treaty]. The primary institutions of the Community are: the European Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and
the European Court of Justice. By the conclusion of the Treaty establishing a Single Council
and a Single Commission of the European Communities, done Apr. 8, 1965, [hereinafter
cited as Merger Treaty], the Council and Commission were made a common institution for
all three treaties: EEC, Euratom, and ECSC. The Assembly and Court of Justice had already been made into common institutions by a Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, which was included among the annexes to the Treaty of
Rome.
Other important Community organs include the Committee of Permanent Representatives (composed of representatives of the Member States appointed by the Council to serve
as a liaison between Commission and Council) and various management committees.
2. For a discussion of the various theoretical bases for granting the Community international legal personality as well as arguments against that personality, see Feld, The Competences of the European Communities for the Conduct of External Relations, 43 TEx. L.
REV. 891 (1965). For background material, see Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 210;
Hohehveldern, The Legal Personality of Internationaland Supranational Organizations,
21 REvuE EGYPrIENE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 35 (1965); Seyersted, Objective International
Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations, 34 NORD. TIDSSKRIFr FOR INT'L REL 1
(1964). The view of the European Parliament is stated in Resolution on the Position of the
European Communities in InternationalLaw, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 239) 16 (1978). Wel-

lenstein, Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations, 16 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 407 (1979) presents a general historical survey of Community external
relations.
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and sign legally binding international contracts with nation states, i.e.,
treaties. This paper will discuss the origin of this treaty-making power in
the legal documents which form the basis of the European Community.
In addition, it will set forth some situational models which outline various
combinations of realistic situations facing a court at tempting to interpret
the treaty-making powers of the EEC. These models will serve as a guide
to understanding the development of the treaty-making power in the case
law of the European Court of Justice (Court, European Court or Court of
Justice) and will provide the framework for the examination of the theoretical development of the treaty-making power by the Court. The paper
will also give an analysis and synthesis of the opinions and judgments of
the Court as well as discuss specific problems created by EEC treatymaking theory and practice vis-a-vis non-Member States. Finally, an attempt will be made to contrast the theoretical development of the treatymaking power with the treaty-making procedure in practice. Future
trends and problems for the EEC treaty-making power shall be examined
in light of this conflict between present theory and practice.
This article shall demonstrate the extent to which the European
Court of Justice has begun to act like a federal constitutional court in its
theoretical development of a Community treaty-making power. This
power permits the EEC to act dynamically and flexibly in concluding
agreements in a changing international environment, but practical application of this theoretical development lags somewhat behind the Court's
decisions.
The integration process of the EEC can be clearly measured by external affairs and treaties. A study of the treaty power is important because it shows the extent to which the Member States have learned to
speak through a single spokesman, and it vividly demonstrates the constitutional problems resulting from the distribution of powers between the
Community and its Member States. The EEC sets examples and illustrates potential problems for other states and economic communities
which contemplate eventual political integration via economic
integration.
II.

THE TREATY POWER IN THE TREATY OF ROME

The Treaty of Rome mentions four main areas of external relations.
These areas are:
a) Commercial Policy: Articles 113, 114 and 116, which apply after
the end of the transitional period, confer on the Community the power to
negotiate and sign commercial treaties. These articles also prescribe voting requirements and procedures for negotiating and signing commercial
agreements with non-Member States.'

3. Rome Treaty, note 1 supra. Article 113 provides:
1. After the transitional period has ended, the common commercial policy
shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff

1983

TREATY POWER

b) Association: Association agreements are trade and aid agreements
with non-European countries which were either colonies or dependent
territories of a Member State at the time the Community was formed.
Developing countries with a "special relation" to a Member State to
whom the Community has decided to give preferential trade status are
also included. While articles 131 to 136 discuss association status for the
above class of countries, article 238, which grants a treaty-making power
and gives procedural guidance for concluding association agreements, includes in its definition of "association" agreements with more than just
the above few categories of states.'

votes, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect
trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commercial policy.
3. Where agreements with third countries need to be negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the
Commission to open the necessary negotiations.
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a
special Committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this
task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to
it.
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council
shall act by a qualified majority.
Article 114 provides:
The agreements referred to in Article 111, (2) and in Article 113 shall be
concluded by the Council on behalf of the Community, acting unanimously
during the first two stages and by a qualified majority thereafter.
Article 116 provides:
From the end of the transitional perios onwards, Member States shall, in
respect of all matters of particular interest in regard to the common market,
proceed within the framework of international organisations of an economic
character by common action. To this end, the Commission shall submit to the
Council, which shall act by a qualified majority, proposals concerning the scope
and implementation of such common action.
During the transitional period, Member States shall consult each other for
the purpose of concerting the action they take and adopting as far as possible a
uniform attitute.
4. Rome Treaty, note 1, supra. Article 238 provides:
The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of States or an
international organisation agreements establishing an association embodying
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures.
These agreements shall be concluded by the Council, acting unanimously
after consulting the Assembly.
Where such agreements call for amendments to this Treaty, these amendments shall first be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 236.
In Cohen, The Association of Third Countries with the E.E.C. Pursuantto Article 238,
26 U. Prrr L. REv. 521, 527 (1965), the author defines the associative relationship based on
article 238 as:
a bilateral relationship, possibly of permanent duration, between the Community acting as a separate personality and a third state, union of states, or international organization, involving fewer rights and obligations than accession to
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c) International Agreements: Articles 229 to 231 require the Community to maintain good relations and cooperation with the United Nations,
the Council of Europe, and the Organisation of European Economic Cooperation (now OECD). Article 228 establishes the general procedures for
the negotiation and signing of all international agreements to which the
Community is a party. 5
d) Admission of New Member States and Amendments: Both articles
228 and 238 provide that an agreement or association may require an
amendment to the Treaty of Rome. The amendment procedure is in article 236. e The powers of the Community can, of course, be increased at
any time by the procedure in article 235.'
These articles indicate, as one writer has concluded, that the authors
of the Treaty of Rome contemplated a scheme which would develop into

full membership, but involving a higher degree of cooperation with and participation in the structure and methods of the Community, usually in the form of
the eventual establishment of a customs union or free trade area, than an ordinary commercial agreement.
P.J.G. Kapteyn & P. Ver Loren Van Themaat, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 351 (1973) distinguish three types of association assistance: "[aissociation as a
special form of development assistance, association as a preliminary to membership of the
EEC, and association as a substitute for such a membership."
5. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 228. Article 228 provides:
1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between
the Community and one or more States or an international organisation, such
agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the powers
vested in the Commission in this field, such agreements shall be concluded by
the Council, after consulting the Assembly where required by this Treaty.
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain beforehand
the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is
compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where an opinion of the Court
of Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance
with Article 236.
2. Agreements concluded under these conditions shall be binding on the
institutions of the Community and on Member States.
6. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 236. Article 236 provides:
The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to
the Council proposals for the amendment of this Treaty.
If the Council, after consulting the Assembly and, where appropriate, the
Commission, delivers an opinion in favour of calling a conference of representatives of the Governments of the Member States, the conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining by common accord the amendments to be made to this Treaty.
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.
7. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 235. Article 235 provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to achieve in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the measures.
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a Community foreign relations power.' Even so, some important constitutional restrictions must be emphasized. First, the association agreements
under article 238 require unanimity. This effectively gives each Member
State a blocking veto. The same veto power exists for amendments under
article 236 and for admission of new members under article 237.
In contrast to association agreements, commercial agreements negotiated under article 113 and concluded under article 114 require only a majority vote of the Council for approval. Thus, based on the Treaty of
Rome, the Community can conclude commercial agreements under its
cognizance even in the face of some Member State opposition. This arrangement is a sign of supranationality and it is a step toward an independent foreign policy, at least in the commercial area.
Article 228 establishes the procedures for negotiating and signing all
international agreements. It applies to both articles 113 and 238 unless
specifically changed by those articles. Article 228 gives Parliament a limited consultative role before the agreement is finally approved by the
Council. It gives the Court the opportunity, if requested, to determine the
compatibility of any proposed agreement with the Treaty of Rome prior
to signature. While article 228 provides the broad framework for international agreements, it does not determine whether the Council vote must
be unanimous or by a majority. However, if article 228 is meant to be
applied to a subject area such as commerce, where only a majority of
Council votes is needed for approval, a treaty-making process exists
under which article 228 provides for potential input by all of the organs
of the EEC. Each organ acts independently within its respective area with
the voting requirement determined by the subject area. Similar procedures are involved with association agreements pursuant to article 238.
Unfortunately, the above constitutional type of procedures which envisage a broad grant of treaty-making power have not been followed in
practice. The source of many problems concerning the practice and procedure of the Community's treaty-making powers lies in the political conflict between the European Commission and the Council of Ministers
(hereinafter referred to as Council). As a representative of the national
interests of the Member States, the Council tends to act in a less Community-oriented fashion than the more integrationist Commission.' This attitude causes the Council to favor legal arguments requiring unanimity
for Council votes, except in the most narrowly defined areas. The Council
fears that an independent Community treaty-making power might be
used to expand the powers of the Community in all areas, much as the
U.S. federal government has used the commerce power to expand its au-

8. Leopold, External Relations Power of the EEC in Theory and in Practice, 26 INr'L
& CoMP. L.Q. 54, 58 (1977).
9. Costonis, The Treatymaking Power of the European Economic Community: The
Perspectives of a Decade, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 421, 427-28 (1967-68); Leopold, supra
note 8, at 59-60; Norton, The Treaty-Making Power of the European Economic Community-A Constitutional Crisis Facing the EEC, 7 INr'L LAW. 589, 589-92 (1973).
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thority. Hence, the Council has looked for ways to enforce a rule of unanimity and to keep to it self any discretionary decision-making power
over the compatibility of agreements with the Treaty of Rome, rather
than surrendering such decisions to the Court. Having explored the origin
of the EEC's treaty-making power, it is appropriate to discuss the theoretical legal development of the treaty-making power by the Court of Justice and the implications of this development.
III.

SOME SITUATIONAL MODELS FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY

POWER
The purpose of this discussion is to set forth some situational models
which present problems and questions concerning treaty interpretation,
i.e., the scope of treaty powers. There are two objectives to this exercise.
The first is to put aside the political conflict between Commission and
Council and to focus attention on the judicial resolution of these situational models in order to understand better the future development of
Community law. The second objective is to make it easier to understand
the influence of the Court's opinions on the development of the Community's treaty-making powers.
The basic divisions among these models are between internal and external powers of the Community, implied and expressed powers in the
Treaty, and internal powers exercised and internal powers unexercised:
Model #1 1. internal powers: expressed and exercised
2. external powers: expressed
Model #2 1. internal powers: expressed and unexercised
2. external powers: expressed
Model #3 1. internal powers: expressed and exercised
2. external powers: implied
Model #4 1. internal powers: expressed and unexercised
2. external powers: implied
Model #5 1. internal powers: implied and exercised
2. external powers: implied

Model #6 1. internal powers: implied and unexercised
2. external powers: implied
The situation presented by the first two models is exemplified by article 113, where the Community may or may not have exercised an express internal power to enact a uniform tariff rate between Member
States. Article 113 also gives an express power to the Community to become a party to an international tariff agreement.10 The first question
presented to the Court in these begin ning models is whether the Court
must link Community desire to exercise an express external power with
an unexercised or exercised express internal power concerning the same
subject matter. As the power to act externally is expressed in article 113,
the linkage seems unnecessary. The Community appears to have the

10. Rome Treaty, note 1 supra. For text of article 113, see note 3 supra.
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power to harmonize both its internal and external regulations concerning
an article 113 subject. Thus it could enact the common external regulation first by international agreement and then at a later date harmonize
the internal regulations. No linkage seems necessary because both powers
are expressed.
A more difficult problem to resolve is whether the express external
power of the Community in models 1 and 2 should be exclusive to the
Community and denied to the Member States altogether. Because the external power over, for example, article 113 subject matter is expressly
mentioned in the Treaty, the obvious argument is that the Member
States have delegated exclusively to the Community all of their sovereignty over international affairs in article 113 subject matter. Any other
decision would allow the individual Member States to set conflicting national tariff rates. Obviously, the avoidance of this chaotic situation was
the very purpose behind the founding of the Community. Therefore, exclusive possession by the Community of external powers where these
powers are expressed in the Treaty seems a necessity for carrying out the
purpose of the Treaty.
Models 3 and 4 present an entirely new set of questions because external powers are implied from the Treaty rather than expressed. These
models can be examined with reference to article 75,"1 which deals with
transport, or those articles which concern Community agricultural and
fisheries policy. In these articles, powers are expressly granted to the
Community for the purpose of harmonizing internal laws and policies in
these areas. No express mention is made of Community powers to negotiate external agreements concerning these subjects. Once again the same
questions must be asked: Must a linkage be established so as to imply an
external power as necessary and proper to effectuate an express internal
power?; Does it matter if the express internal power has not yet been
exercised?; Finally, in either of these situations is this implied external
power of the Community exclusive for that subject matter?
Considering these problems, we can reflect on what could happen if
an express power is not implied as being necessary and proper to give
effect to a common internal policy. One Member State could ratify an
international agreement with several non-Member States. At that point
in time, the agreement could be in harmony with a common Community
internal policy. Several years later, a majority of the Community could
vote to change the internal policy, thus forcing the Member State either
to break its prior harmonious, but now conflicting, international contract
or to live with disharmonious internal and external Community policies
in an area such as transport, fisheries or agriculture.
This awkward situation can be carried a step further with the result
that several Member States refuse to vote to change or to advance Community internal harmonization because of previously made external

11. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 75.
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agreements that over the years have become extremely advantageous to
their national interests. This situation could result in temporary "freezes"
in the advancement of internal harmonization policies until the benefits
of these prior external agreements were reaped by a few Member States.
In such a case, the external policies of the Member States would be dictating the pace of progress toward intra-Community harmonization. This
is exactly the reverse method of approach sought by the Community's
founders.
The above situation would only be compounded if the internal subject area required unanimity for internal Community harmonization. In
that case, a prior lucrative external agreement of only one Member State
could force a "freeze" in internal development.
This "freezing" can only be avoided if external powers are implied
from express internal powers both where the Community has already enacted a common internal policy, as well as where the Community has not
yet acted. In the situation where the Community has not yet acted, it is
necessary to imply an external power without linkage to an exercised internal power for two reasons. First, a previously made external agreement
of a Member State or States could delay the creation of a common internal policy to which the desired external power must be linked. This would
result in closing out some Community options on the type and method of
both internal and external unification. The Community must be able to
decide for itself whether first to unify its external or internal policies over
subject matter within its cognizance. Second, requiring linkage of an implied external power to an exercised internal power would create a problem if at some future date the internal power is no longer exercised. Does
that mean the external power lapses automatically? Does this result in
voiding international agreements and contracts?
On the exclusivity issue, it is again conceivable to envision concurrent Member State and Community external policies. Nevertheless, while
the external policies may be harmonious at a given point in time, the
same problems of potential future disharmonization result as with models
1 and 2. Once the external policy is implied as covering a given subject
area, the Community external policy must eventually move toward exclusivity or, at the very least, supremacy over conflicting national external
policy.
Models 5 and 6 represent the highest level of legal powers of a consti-

tutional community. In each. case neither in t er-

o etinl

npQo

a specific nature are mentioned in the constitutional document. Yet, any
constitutional court knows that a community must remain dynamic and
responsive to events unanticipated when the founding documents of the
community were drafted. In order for the Community to remain flexible,
the Court may have to look to the purposes, general principles, or objectives sought to be achieved in the creation of the Community. From these
objectives or general principles, the Court can imply a power in the Community in order for the Community to preserve itself as a dynamic international organism capable of achieving the purposes for which it was
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founded. This power also enables the Community to act in a changing
international or national environment.
If a constitutional court is incapable of implying either an internal or
an external power to the Community as in models 5 and 6, it is only a
matter of time before the problems of national interest will conflict with
Community development and "freeze" any further integration. The
changing factors of time and events acting on an inflexible government or
Community constitution will produce these problems of conflict. It may
not even be necessary to come to grips with any Member State nationalism. Chief Justice Marshall, writing in McCullough v. Maryland, addressed the same phenomenon.12
With these situational models in mind, the next part of the article
examines the case law of the European Court of Justice. Since the issues
involved in these cases relate to one or more of the situational models, it
may be easier to analyze the Court's development of Community treatymaking power. Also, the previous discussion may have pointed out some
realistic Community and constitutional dynamics operating beneath the
political conflicts which are obvious on the face of each case.

IV. THE THEORETICAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREATY POWER
IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

A.

Commission v. Council

Before analyzing the European Court of Justice cases concerning
treaty-making, it should be pointed out that the Council-oriented procedures to be discussed were in use for over a decade. The fact that such a
length of time passed before the Court decided a case in this most sacred
of sovereign state power areas is a significant indication of the Commission's desire to avoid any violent confrontation with the Council. It also
could be argued that this delay illustrated the Court's avoidance of such a
confrontation until the Commission forced the issue.
The issue of the scope of Community treaty-making powers first
reached the Court in 1971. In discussing foreign relations, the Treaty of
Rome specifically mentions only commercial agreements, associations,
and the admission of new members. The major issues in Commission v.
Council's were whether the Community had an implied external affairs

12. In McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819), Chief Justice Mar-

shall stated:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients
which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves.
13. Comm'n of the European Communities v. Council of the Communities, 1971 C. J.
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power beyond those external powers specifically expressed in the Treaty
of Rome, and if so, whether the external powers were exclusive to the
Community or concurrent with those of the Member States. Thus, the
case was similar to situational model 3 of part III.
The dispute arose out of negotiations with third countries which
aimed at creating uniform working conditions for crews on trucks engaged
in international transport. The problem had been attacked by the International Labor Bureau, the International Labor Organization, and finally
in 1962, by the Economic Commission for Europe in the United Nations.
In 1962, this latter organization proposed to the governments of the European countries a European Agreement on Working Conditions in Road
Transport (E.R.T.A.)." The agreement was signed by five of the then six
Member States of the Community and several other governments, but did
not come into force due to an insufficient number of ratifications. 6
Meanwhile, the Community drafted its own regulation which was
slightly different from E.R.T.A. This regulation was in effect within the
Community, but the effective date regarding traffic between the Community and non-Member States was postponed because of a Community desire to reconcile the regulation with the continuing dis-cussions over
E.R.T.A. by the U.N. Commission. Finally, the Council compromised by
amending the Community regulation to bring it into alignment with the
new E.R.T.A. At the same time, the Council coordinated the negotiating
positions of the Member States so that each could sign the agreement in
its individual capacity without violating a Community regulation.
The Commission adamantly opposed this procedure. It insisted that
because there was a Community regulation on road haulage, the Community alone, and not the Member States individually, had the right to participate in the continuing E.R.T.A. negotiations and to sign the new
accord.
The Commission argued that article 75, which gave the Community
broad po wers to implement a common transport policy, must apply to
relations with third countries." This power was granted by paragraph
1(c) of article 75, which permitted "any other appropriate provisions" to
be used by the Council acting by qualified majority, after the transition
period, upon a proposal by the Commission to create a common transport
policy. The Commission argued that a common internal transport policy

Comm. E. Rec. 263; 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
Rzp. (CCH) 8134 [hereinafter cited as Commission v. Council]. For discussions on this case
see Collinson, Foreign Relations Powers of the European Communities: A Comment on
Commission v. Council, 23 STA. L. REv. 956 (1971); Malawer, Treaty-Making Competence
of the European Communities, 7 J. WORLD TRANSNAT'L L. 169 (1973); Norton, supra note 9,
at 602-10; Winter, Annotation to Case 22/70, Re ERTA, Commission of the EC v. Council
of the EC, 8 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 550 (1971).
14. Commission v. Council, COMMON MKT. REP. 8134, at 7518.
15. Id. at 7521.
16. Id.
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would be meaningless unless there was a coordinated common transport
policy toward third countries. 7
The Commission argued for a theory of "parallelism." Under this
theory, once the Community has adopted a regulation creating a common
internal policy in a given area, for example, road haulage in the transport
area, the Member States are precluded from dealing with that matter not
only internally, but also in negotiations with third states." Thus, the
competence of the Community would slowly expand externally and become exclusive as common policies in, for example, transport, were created internally. The Commission believed this development would insure
that no conflict existed between internal and external agreements and
that all common policies would be subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court. 9 The "qualified majority" rule in article 75 would also be
preserved.
The Council replied that the only external powers given the Community were those powers specifically expressed in the Treaty of Rome. 0
Article 75 did not imply the powers given in the commercial area of articles 111 and 113. The Council argued that article 75 applied only to intraCommunity measures. On the exclusivity issue, the Council maintained
that Member States were free to negotiate individual external transport
measures as long as no Community regulations were violated.' Even if
article 75 did permit the Community to conclude external transport
agreements, the Council felt the power would at most be concurrent with
that of Member States and that the Council itself would decide in each
case whether an international agreement should be concluded by the
Community, by the Member States, or by both." Naturally, the Commission denied the Council this discretion because such discretion would be
at the mercy of the unanimity rule and would give the Council a function
belonging to the Court.
Basically, the Court sustained the Commission's position. Recognizing that the Treaty did not contain specific provisions relating to the conclusion of external transport agreements, the Court stated that in such
cases it becomes necessary to refer to the general system of Community
law on relations with third countries.' 3 A common transport policy was
one of the principle objectives upon which the Community had been or17. Id. at 7522.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7522-23.
21. Id. at 7523.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 7524-25. The Court interpreted article 210 as follows:
Article 210 provides that 'the Community has legal personality.' This provision, which is the first provision in Part Six of the Treaty, devoted to 'General
and Final Provisions,' means that in external relations the Community has the
power to establish contractual relations with third States in the entire field of
the objectives defined in the first part of the Treaty. . . . (emphasis added).
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ganized and was specifically mentioned in part one, article 3(e) of the
Treaty.2" Under article 75, common transport rules shall be applicable to
"international transport from or to the territory of a Member State or
passing across the territory of one or more Member States."2 5 Since that
provision applies for the part of the transport route to transport to or
from third countries, the Court held that the design for a common transport policy, "presupposes that the Community's competence covers regulations governed by international law and to that extent implies the need
for agreements with the third States concerned."2
In all cases where the Treaty fails to specifically grant external negotiating authority, the Court will decide whether a common objective merits granting such authority by considering substantive and other Treaty
provisions flowing from acts adopted within the framework of those provisions.27 Here the Court accepted the idea that the Community must
necessarily have "implied" and/or "inherent" treaty-making powers,
which flow from both the specific provisions and the general principles of
the Treaty. Even though the transport articles 748 and 7529 did not expressly provide for a Community power to conclude external agreements,
the coming into force of a Community regulation establishing a common
policy internally "necessarily had the effect of giving the Community the
power to conclude with third states any agreements relating to matters
governed by that regulation."8 0
With regard to the exclusivity of these external agreements, once the
agreements are concluded, the Court grants the Community the exclusive
right to regulate external transportation to implement Treaty policy.31

24. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, pt. one, art. 3(e).
25. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 75.
26. Commission v. Council, COMMON MKT. REP. 18134, at 7525.
27. Id. The Court stated:
In order to determine, in a specific case, whether the Community has the
power to conclude international agreements, the organization as well as the
substantive provisions of the Treaty need be considered. This power results
not only from an express attribution in the Treaty-which is the case for Article 113 and 114 dealing with tariff and trade agreements and Article 238 in
association agreements-but can also flow from other Treaty provisions and
from acts adopted within the framework of those provisions by the Community
institutions ....
28. Rome Treaty, note 1 s.upra. Article 74 provides: "The objectives of this Treaty
shall, with regard to the subject covered by this title, be pursued by the Member States
within the framework of a common transport policy."
29. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 75.
30. Commission v. Council, COMMON MKT. REP. T8134, at 7525.
31. Id. The Court said:
Particularly where, in order to implement a common policy set forth in the
Treaty, the Community has taken measures providing for common rules in any
form, the Member States no longer have the right, either individually or collectively, to contract with third States for obligations that impair these rules. As
these common rules are gradually introduced, the Community alone can assume and execute, for the entire field of application of the Community's legal
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Thus, there was to be nonconcurrent power in the area of external transport policy once the common regulation of transport within the Community had been established."s Furthermore, article 5 of the Treaty requires
Member States to abstain from any measures that could jeopardize the
realization of Community goals.38 The Court also interpreted article 5 as
disapproving concurrent external agreements by Member States.3
The Court agreed with the Council on the merits of the case, but
adopted the "implied powers" approach by accepting the parallelism doctrine. The case reflects the cynicism of Marbury v. Madison," which set
forth strong federal constitutional doctrine yet gave the decision to the
party seeking to limit federal power. Pescatore called the judgment a
"prospective ruling."' s
The following rules seem to have been set forth in the European
Court decision.37 First, the Court accepted the idea that the Community
had "implied" and "inherent" powers of treaty making that flow from
both specific Treaty provisions and from the general principles of the
Treaty.88 Second, by accepting the theory of parallelism, the Court held
that the scope of the treaty power depended upon the establishment of
common rules which would implement a common policy envisaged in the
Treaty. As these common rules are established, the Community becomes
competent to have exclusive rights to negotiate internationally in the ar-

system, contractual obligations vis-a-vis third States. It would therefore be impossible, in implementing the Treaty provisions, to separate the rules applicable to intra-Community measures from those applicable to external relations.
32. Id. "Any initiative taken outside the framework of the common institutions is incompatible with the unity of the Common Market and the uniform application of Community law."

33. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5. Article 5 provides:
Member States shall take all general or particular measures which are appropriate for ensuring the carrying out of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Community. They
shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's aims. They shall abstain
from any measures likely to jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this
Treaty.
34. Commission v. Council, COMMON MKT. REP. 8134, at 7523.
35. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
36. Pescatore, External Relations in Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 615, 625 (1979).
37. The distinction which common law countries make between dicta and holding is not
made in civil law courts such as the European Court. Even though civil law courts profess
not to give precedential effect to prior decisions, such statements which the European Court
has made on the scope of treaty-making powers become important for future cases because
civil law courts accord to a consistent line to decisions of the highest court a "jurisprudence
constante" which closely resembles common law courts "stare decisis." See generally J.H.
MERRYMAN, THE CIVmL LAW TRADITION 48-49 (1969); E.H. WALL,THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITmS 811 (1966) (considering the place of the Court in the Community structure as well as the civil law tradition, it is probably fair to give equal weight to

dicta and holdings).
38. Commission v. Council,

COMMON MKT. REP.

8134, at 7533-37.
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eas of these common rules." This exclusivity prohibits any form of coor40
dination of common action by Member States themselves in those areas.
There are several implications to be drawn from these rules which
concern the practice of EEC treaty making. First, there was no legal basis
for the Council's attempts to limit articles 238 and 228.41 Second, use of
the mixed agreement procedure was no longer necessary and was possibly
an illegal breach of the exclusivity rule.42 Third, the Community's external competence could grow according to the principle in foro interno,.in
foro externo. Article 235 also could be used to increase the external powers of the Community. Fourth, the power of the Commission should be
enhanced because article 228 grants the Commission the power to negoti43
ate agreements, usually on the basis of a proposal by the Commission.
Fifth, Community power should be increased because when the Community alone signs an agreement, national parliamentary ratification procedures are avoided and Member States are automatically bound." Sixth,
the transfer of some foreign affairs powers to the Community would create a dynamic "dialogue" within the Community between Commission
and Council and would "augur a substantial weakening of the political
power of the national governments."'4" Naturally, not all the rules derived
from the opinion have been followed, nor have all the implications come
to pass. But the Court has never reversed course in its inter-pretation of
the treaty-making power as this interpretation was first enunciated in
Commission v. Council.
The Court in Commission v. Council recognized the problem which
was illustrated in situational model 3: namely, the problem between a
Community external policy and a Member State external policy'" on the
same topic. However, the resolution of the issue was viewed in terms of
the potential impairment of the achievement of a common internal policy,
rather than of a statement regarding the "freezing" of any future Community development. Also, the Court attempted to find the power to conclude international agreements on transport in the Treaty text itself, using article 75(a), without attaching much relevance to a "necessary and
proper" or an "all other appropriate means" type of clause. 4
B.

No.1/75: Opinion of the Court of Justice
In July 1975, the Commission submitted to the Court of Justice a

39. Id.

40. Id.
41.
42.
ticipate
43.
44.

See Pt. V, infra.
Id. In the mixed agreement procedure, both Community and Member States parin signature and ratification of the agreement.
Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 228.
Collinson, supra note 13, at 971.

45. Id. at 970.
46. Commission v. Council,
47. Id. at 7534-35.

COMMON MKT.REP.

8134, at 7535-36.
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request for an opinion pursuant to the second paragraph of article 228(1)
of the Treaty of Rome. ' 8 The object of the request was to obtain the
Court's opinion as to the compatibility to the Treaty of a draft "Understanding on a Local Cost Standard," drawn up under OECD auspices for
the purpose of establishing a pricing standard for governmental credit
financing of export contracts. 4' The request asked the Court to comment
on whether the EEC had the power to conclude such an agreement and if
so, whether the power was exclusive.'"
After accepting jurisdiction, the Court held that the subject matter of
the agreement was within the sphere of the common commercial policy of
articles 113 and 114; therefore, the subject of the agreement was within

the ambit of Community power. The Court proceeded to uphold the
power of the Community to make agreements with third countries, even
where it had not previously possessed common internal rules.5" This holding went beyond Commission v. Council by concluding that common internal rules were not a prerequisite for external power, at least in the
commercial area. In transport and other non-commercial areas, the rule of
parallelism presumably remained. Finally, the Court again remained firm
regarding the issue of exclusivity and denied any right of concurrent
Member State power in the field of export policy."

48. Re the OECD Understanding on a Local Cost Standard (Opinion 1/75), 1975 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1355, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 85, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8365 [hereinafter cited as Opinionl/75]. Rome Treaty art. 228(1) provides a
consultative procedure, whereby the Commission, Council, or a Member State may request
an Opinion from the Court as to whether the proposed agreement is compatible with the
Treaty. If the Court decides against compatibility then the procedure in article 236 (amendment) must be used. For a review of the case, see Kapteyn, The Common Commercial Policy of the European Economic Community's Power and the European Court of Justice's
Opinion of November 11, 1975, 11 TEx. INT'L L.J. 485 (1976); Mass, The External Powers of
the EEC with regard to a CommercialPolicy: Comment on Opinion 1/75, 13 COMMON MKT.
L. REv. 379 (1976); Simmonds, External Relations Power of the EECA Recent Ruling of the
European Court, 26 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 208 (1977).
49. Opinion 1/75, COMMON MKT. REP. 18365, at 7638.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 7642. The Court said: "A commercial policy is in fact made up by the combination and interaction of internal and external measures, without priority being taken by
one over the others. Sometimes agreements are concluded in execution of a policy fixed in
advance, sometimes that policy is defined by the agreements themselves."
52. Id. at 7643.
It cannot therefore be accepted that, in a field such as that governed by
the Understanding in question, which is covered by export policy and more
generally by the common commercial policy, the Member States should exercise a power concurrent with that of the Community, in the Community sphere
and in the international sphere ....
To accept that the contrary were true would amount to recognizing that,
in relations with third countries, Member States may adopt positions which
differ from those which the Community intends to adopt, and would thereby
distort the institutional framework, call into question the mutual trust within
the Community and prevent the latter from fulfilling its task in the defense of
the common interest.
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When comparing Opinion No. 1/75 to the situational models, the
facts appear to fit model 2. The commercial power is clearly expressed in
articles 113 and 114, but in the facts of the case this internal power remained unexercised. The case followed model 2 in not requiring linkage
to an express exercised internal power before the express external power
could be exercised. Common internal rules were not a prerequisite to external power, at least in the commercial area. After Opinion No. 1/75,
however, the question remained whether common internal rules were still
a prerequisite in other areas.
C.

In re Kramer

In re Kramer6s concerned a referral of a series of questions on external affairs from the Dutch district courts pursuant to article 177." Certain criminal prosecutions had been brought against some Dutch
fishermen for violations of Dutch national laws aimed at ensuring the
conservation of sole and plaice stocks in the northeast Atlantic. The
Dutch laws were enacted pursuant to commitments which had been entered into by the Dutch Government within the framework of a non-EEC
convention designed to conserve fish stocks in the Atlantic.55 Meanwhile
in 1970, and again in 1976, the Council had passed regulations seeking to
establish some common policy on fishing and fish conservation.
The principle issue was whether the Community now had exclusive
authority to enter into such commitments as those that the Netherlands
had previously entered into. In reaching its decision the Court once again
considered the authority of the Community to enter into international
commitments. As in Commission v. Council, the Court found an implied
external affairs power in the Treaty." Having established Community authority to enter into international commitments for the conservation of
sea resources, the Court concluded on the facts of the cases before it that
57
the Community had not yet fully exercised its authority in this area.
Therefore, Community policy was not yet exclusive, nor was there any
existing conflict between the Community policy and national commitments by the Dutch Government. However, the Court pointed out that
while the Community power was not yet exclusive, the authority of the
Member States in this area was in transition and Member States concerned were "now bound by Community obligations in their negotiations
within the framework of the Convention and of other comparable agree-

53. In re Kramer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1279, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 440, [1976
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 18372.
54. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
55. North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention, Jan. 24, 1959, 486 U.N.T.S. 7078 (entered into force June 25, 1963). The Convention was signed by seven non-EEC countries as
well as members of the EEC, saving only Italy and Luxembourg.
56. In re Kramer, COMMON MKT. REP. 8372, at 7741.
57. Id. at 7742.
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ments."s5 Reference was made, as in Commission v. Council, to articles 5
and 116 of the Treaty.6"
The case added little to the principles that had been set forth in
Commission v. Council. The facts of the case fit neatly into situational
models 3 and 4. The case points out that there is a sliding scale for determining when subject matter has come under Community cognizance during periods of transition. 0 At one end of the scale the Member States are
free to enter international agreements. As Community policies are enacted, the Member States must harmonize their external acts with Community policy, and coordinate policies between themselves. Eventually,

the other end of the scale will be reached.
All Member State initiative on
61
an international level will be forbidden.

The question remains: What specific common internal policies create
an external power requiring a prohibition of individual Member State external action? Advocate-General Trabucchi argued in In re Kramer that a
functional relationship between activity taking place outside the Community's geographical area and activity arising within that area is an essential condition for recognition of the exclusively Community nature of external power. 62 If no "functional relationship" exists whereby internal
rules are affected by external policy, and vice versa, then presumably the
Community could not have an implied external treaty-making power in
that area even though common internal rules existed. The Court did not
comment upon this attempt by the Advocate-General to answer questions

58. Id.
59. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 5, 116. Article 5 of the Treaty of Rome has been a
favorite of the Court for requiring Member States to fall in line behind Community policy
and for the Court to justify the exclusive power of the Community in external matters under
its cognizance. Article 5 reads: "Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from action taken by institutions of the Community ...
and . . . shall facilitate
the achievement of the Community's tasks."
60. Commission v. Council, COMMON MKT. REP. 8134.
61. In re Kramer, COMMON MKT. REP. 8372, at 7748. Advocate General Alberto
Trabucchi expressed this very clearly:
[T]he mere existence of Community legislative powers in a particular field does
not suffice to deprive the States of power to negotiate internationally in that
field. On the other hand . . . there must have been an exercise of this power
and to this end Community rules must have been actually applied in this field:
only, in this way can the international jurisdiction of the States be fully replaced by that of the Community.
Id.
Within the fisheries area, the Council had to act to create a common conservation policy
before the end of the transition period; see article 210 of the Act of Accession. For more on
how this point created problems in the Court's reasoning, see Koers, The External Authority of the EEC in Regard to Marine Fisheries, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 269, 294-98 (1977).
62. "An essential condition for recognition of the exclusively Community nature of external powers is the existence of a functional relationship between activity taking place
outside the Community's geographical area properly so-called, which is the subject of international rules, and the common rules governing activity arising within that area." In re

Kramer,

COMMON MET.

REP. 8372, at 7746.
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raised by critics of the Commission v. Council decision on how to determine which internal rules create external Community powers. In practice,
however the "functional relationship" test would probably not make
much difference. The Court of Justice would have to determine whether a
"functional relationship" existed, in the same manner in which the Supreme Court of the United States decides whether interstate commerce is
affected. The Court's support of Community goals would probably be a
more crucial factor in deciding close cases than would facts attempting to
prove that a "functional relationship" existed.
On the other hand, if the "functional relationship" test was adopted
as the test for determining implied external powers, the question would
be: What happens when that relationship ceases to exist? For example,
there may be a clear "functional relationship" between internal and external policy at point A in time. If five years later at point B the relationship no longer exists, does the Community automatically lose its legitimacy to act externally? The "functional relationship" test seems to raise
almost as many questions as it resolves. If the test is adopted, it must be
accepted in such a way that the Community's ability to change over time
remains unimpaired.
D.

No. 1/76: Opinion of the Court of Justice

The fourth important comment on external affairs was delivered by
the Court in April 1977 in another opinion on a proposed agreement.6 3
The Commission requested the Court's opinion as to whether a draft
agreement establishing a laying-up fund for surplus inland waterway vessels in the Rhine and Moselle basins was compatible with the Treaty. The
agreement involved both a new and an old issue for the Court.6 First, the
essence of the agreement was the establishment of the "Fund," which was
to be an international public institution having legal capacity and personality. Therefore, the Court had to decide whether the Community could
delegate certain of its decisional and judicial powers to bodies independent of EEC institutions. Second, as most Member States were already
parties to two previous conventions on river traffic which would require
amendment, the Court was asked to approve a multilateral agreement to
which not only the Community and the third state, Switzerland, would be
parties, but to which EEC Member States who were signatory to the Conventions on the navigation of the Rhine and the Moselle also would be
On the first issue, the Commission said that "once external powers

63. Re the Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-Up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels (Opinion 1/76), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 741, 20 Common Mkt. L.R. 279,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RaP. (CCH) 8405, at 7291.
64. Id. A third issue concerned the organization and powers of a tribunal that was to
interpret and apply the agreement. The Court went on to hold that the proposed Fund
Tribunal was too closely interwoven with the European Court to be able to avoid a conflict
of interest.
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are given by the Treaty to the Community the latter must necessarily be
entitled to exercise those powers in the same conditions and according to
rules which are as extensive as those governing the external powers of the
Member States from which they have been withdrawn ....
The only
limitation on this grant would be that the Community could not surrender powers given by the Treaty to the common institutions of the Community." The grant must also be compatible with the common interests
of the Community. e7 The Council of course argued that a transfer of powers from Community institutions, rather than a delegation of limited
managerial functions, was in fact what the agreement envisaged."
*"

The Court opined that article 75(1)(c), which empowered the Council
to lay down "any other appropriate provisions" for the establishment of a
common transport policy, entitled the Community to cooperate with a
third country in setting up a public international institution." This conclusion increased the scope of the implied powers of the Community. It is
significant that the Treaty article used was the transport article 75(1)(c),
which was involved in Commission v. Council, and not the more specific
commercial trade articles 111 and 113 of the Treaty, which contain spe70
cific grants of power.
On the second issue concerning the mixed agreement process, the
Commission noted that there were no common internal rules presently in
existence within the Community on river transport laying-up. Again raising the question that had been left unanswered in Opinion No. 1/75, the
Commission argued that, as with the commercial policy agreements in
Opinion No. 1/75, transport and other agreements could be made with
third countries even where the Community had not previously had common internal rules. 71 The Commission argued for the ability to choose
between either setting forth common rules internally and then negotiating an agreement, or introducing both the common internal policy and

65. Id. at 7296.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 7298.
69. Id. at 7301.
70. The Court went on to disapprove the agreement because the proposed Fund supervisory body gave Member States certain individual votes in an area of common Community
policy that should have resulted in a single Community vote. There were other arrange•ments that the Court considered incompatible with the "requirements of unity and solidarity" expressed in Commission v. Council.
71. Opinion No. 1/76, COMMON MKT. REP. 78405, at 7297.
[T]he Commission considers that it is possible to infer that such power exists
once the Treaty provides for an internal power even if the latter has not yet
been the subject of developments of secondary legislation. Thus, there is nothing to prevent the Community, as in the present case, from concluding the
agreement with the third state and adopting the necessary internal measures
at the same time. The procedure in two stages which was the hypothesis in the
AETR Case (Commission v. Council) is not therefore mandatory as the only
one applicable.
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the international agreement at the same time, when implementing a common policy involving an agreement with a third county.
Looking at the situational models, one sees that Opinion No. 1/75
resembles model 2. The Opinion states that the external powers of the
Community in the commercial area flow directly from Treaty articles 113
and 114. They do not depend on the parallelism theory for their legal
justification. A common external policy can be enacted at the same time,
before or after common internal commercial rules are enacted.
On the other hand, when models 3 and 4 are applicable as in Commission v. Council, In re Kramer, and Opinion No. 1/76, the parallelism
theory would not permit expansion of external power prior to the enactment of common internal rules. While the parallelism theory does not
suggest that external power flows from common internal regulations,
under the parallelism theory external power at the very least is controlled
by the extent to which common internal policies have been established,
i.e., "in foro interno, in foro externo." Therefore, while at first sight the
arguments made by the Commission in Opinion No.1/76 appear to come
close to opinions in the commercial area, there may in fact still be some
legal distinction between external commercial agreements of a model 2
nature and agreements made in model 3 and 4 situations (noncommercial) which are justified on the parallelism theory.
Procedurally, the parallelism theory would permit transport policy to
be established at the same time that common internal regulations had
been established, or afterwards. However, to argue that an external transport agreement could be signed before an internal common regulation
had been enacted would be to go beyond the strict theory of parallelism.
To substantively argue that Community powers in external affairs flow
directly from article 75, for example in the transport area, and are neither
controlled nor limited by the enactment of a common internal policy
would also serve to extend the theory of parallelism. It would be the same
as arguing that article 75 alone supports an external power just as does
article 113.
In its opinion on the second issue concerning the argument over the
necessity of a mixed agreement process, the Court finally broke free from
the constraints of the parallelism theory and decided squarely on the side
of the Commission. The implications of this decision, therefore, carry the
'curt byod.......;
the.
f prllism.
Th Pxt .rnal treaty-making
power of the Community was held to be derived from and limited, if at
all, by the implied powers of the Treaty. The external powers are not to
be limited by the extent to which a common internal policy has been
72
established.

72. Id. at 7301. The Court said:
The Court has concluded, inter alia, that whenever Community law has created for the institutions of the Community powers within its internal system
for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the Community has authority
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With regard to the mixed agreement nature of the agreement, the
Court made clear that that arrangement was due only to the uniqueness
of having two previous arrangements in existence that would permit
Member States also to participate as signatories in their capacities as parties to those previous conventions. Their signatures were not necessary to
lend legitimacy to the Community's signature."3
In conclusion, Opinion No. 1/76 once again takes Community treatymaking powers forward from Commission v. Council. The Community
can now delegate certain of its managerial powers to international bodies
created to implement common policy objectives of the Treaty. It is not
bound to use the mixed agreement procedure unless special circumstances dictate, and most important, its external powers in all areas of
common Community objectives derive from the Treaty by implication,
regardless of the extent to which these common objectives have been
achieved internally. The Court has permitted the Community to act flexibly and dynamically in model 4 type situations without the theoretical
legal constraints of parallelism.
E. No. 1/78: Opinion of the Court of Justice Concerning the
Incompatability of InternationalAgreements with the Treaty
The most recent opinion concerning the treaty-making powers of the
Community was delivered in October 1979.7' The Commission asked the
Court whether a draft agreement on natural rubber negotiated under the
auspices of UNCTAD was within the exclusive competence of the Community to sign. The main feature of the agreement was the establishment
of a buffer stock designed to stabilize world natural rubber prices. Two
negotiating sessions were completed, and the UNCTAD negotiating conference planned to adopt the final text of the agreement at its next
conference.
The Commission argued that the envisaged agreement came entirely

to enter into the international commitments necessary for the attainment of
that objective even in the absence of an express provision in that connection.
4. This is particularly so in all cases in which internal power has already
been used in order to adopt measures which come within the attainment of
common politice. It is, however, not limited to that eventuality. [Tihe power
to bind the Community vis-a-vis third countries .

.

. flows by implication

from the the provisions of the Treaty creating the internal power ....
(emphasis added).
73. Id. at 7302.
The participation of these States in the Agreement must be ... solely for this
purpose and not as necessary for the attainment of other features of the system ....

[T]he legal effects of the Agreement ...

result, in accordance with

Article 228(2) of the Treaty, exclusively from the conclusion of the latter by
the Community.
74. Re the Int'l Agreement on Natural Rubber (Opinion 1/78), 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 2871, 26 Common Mkt. L. R. 629, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 18600, at 8755.
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within the context of article 113 relating to common commercial policy."
Hence, the Community alone was entitled to negotiate and conclude the
agreement on the basis of its exclusive powers. While stating that the
purpose of the request for an opinion from the Court was strictly limited
to the instant facts, the Commission urged the Court to clarify the general question of the interpretation of article 113 of the Treaty.7 6 The
Commission stated that "the field of commercial policy cannot . . .be
restricted to the non-exhaustive assertions of article 113" and that the
Court itself had pointed out in Opinion No. 1/75 that "the concept of
commercial policy has the same content whether it is applied in the context of the international action of a State or to that of the Community." 77
For the Commission, a measure of commercial policy must be assessed
"primarily by reference to its specific character as an instrument regulat7' 8
ing international trade.
The Council argued that the subject matter of the agreement fell
partly outside article 113 and required the common coordination of Member States within international economic bodies mentioned in article 116.
Therefore, a division of powers between the Community and the Member
States was called for, requiring that the agreement be concluded by the
mixed agreement process.70 The Council believed there was such close interrelation between the Community's powers and the Member State's
powers that the commercial interests of the Community were inseparable
from the international political interests which rightfully belonged to the
Member States.80
With regard to the general interpretation of article 113, the Council
argued that the Commission was asking the Court to take a fixed position
on article 113 for all future international commodity agreements, and to
adopt a position against the mixed agreement procedure used in previous
commodity agreements. According to the Council, this was a misuse of
article 228.81 In any event, the Council stressed that the definition of a
commercial policy measure falling within the meaning of article 113 must
depend upon whether the intent behind the measure is to influence the
volume or flow of trade, not on the instrumental criterion of the
82
Commission.
The Court, in affirming both its own and the Community's power,
faced all of the above arguments squarely. First, with respect to the
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 8760.
at 8762.
at 8764.
at 8772.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 8762. The Commission acknowledged that no Community position existed as
of that time. It asked the Court "to rule on the difference of opinion between it and the
Council on the interpretation of Article 113 and, in addition, to adopt a position of principle
against the practice of 'mixed-type' agreements .
82. Id. at 8772.
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Council's argument that article 228 procedure does not lend itself to the
settling of questions relating to the division of powers in matters of external relations or with regard to the general interpretation of article 113
and the mixed agreement procedure, the Court affirmed its own competence to act under article 228. 88 Where doubt arises regarding the division
of powers in the matter of negotiation and conclusion of international
agreements, past established practice was not to prevent the Council, the
Commission or the Member States from resorting to the procedures in
article 228.8 '
Second, the Court again dismissed any argument that the request for
an opinion was premature. This time the Court emphasized that when a
question of powers is at issue, it is of concern not only to Member States
but also to non-Member countries that such a question be clarified as
soon as negotiations are commenced."s This statement revealed the
Court's sensitivity to the increasingly complex problem of third-country

negotiations with the EEC.
Third, the Court addressed the central issue of whether the proposed
agreement came totally within article 113. Here the Court considered the
political ramifications of the developmental problems associated with a
commercial policy toward third world producers of rubber, and then proceeded to set forth its expansive interpretation of what article 113 included.8s The Court emphasized that the Community must have the ver-

83. Id. at 8778. The Court said: "[Uinder the procedure of Article 228, like that of
Article 103 of the EAEC Treaty, it is possible to deal with all questions which concern the
compatibility with the provisions of the Treaty of an agreement envisaged. . . ." Referring
to its previous case law, the Court held: "[A] judgment on the compatibility of an agreement
with the Treaty may depend not only on provisions of substantive law but also on those
concerning the powers, procedure or organization of the institutions of the Community."
84. Id. at 8778.
85. Id..
86. Id. at 8780. The Court stated as follows:
Following the impluse given by UNCTAD to the development of this type
of control it seems that it would no longer be possible to carry on any worthwhile common commercial policy if the Community were not in a position to
avail itself also of more elaborate means devised with a view to furthering the
development of international trade. It is therefore not possible to lay down, for
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, an interpretation the effect of which would be
to restrict the common commercial policy to the use of instruments intended
to have an effect only on the traditional aspects of external trade to the exclusion of more highly developed mechanisms such as appear in the agreement
envisaged ....
Although it may be thought that at the time when the Treaty
was drafted liberalization of trade was the dominant idea, the Treaty nevertheless does not form a barrier to the possibility of the Community's developing a
commercial policy aiming at a regulation of the world market for certain products rather than a mere liberalization of trade.
[T]he enumeration in Article 113 of the subjects covered by commercial
policy ...
is conceived as a nonexhaustive enumeration which, must not, as
such, close the door to the application in a Community context of any other
process intended to regulate external trade.
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satility to regulate external trade and the power to effect more highly
developed mechanisms of international trade. The Court applied both
definitions urged by the Commission and by the Council in order to find
the proposed agreement one of commercial policy. The Court, however,
did not want to limit the scope of article 113 by any a priori technical
legal definition of commercial trade."'
Finally, the Court held that participation in the agreement with the
Community would be permitted only if the financing arrangements of the
final agreement provided for financing by the Member States in their individual capacities, rather than by Community financing through Member State contributions to the Community." A further exception was
made for the French and British Governments, which could participate
individually, but only in their capacities as the legal representatives of
dependent territories which were not members of the Community and
which had been called upon to participate in the international rubber
convention."
Opinion No. 1/78 is a refinement and consolidation of the broad view
regarding what constitutes Community commercial policy under article
113. The Court first established this view in Commission v. Council and
again in Opinion No. 1/75. In the earlier opinions the Court included in
article 113 matters which were not specifically mentioned in the article, so
long as the purpose of the agreement was to implement one of the objectives upon which the Community had been founded and which was stated
in the Treaty. In the instant opinion, the Court further refined the definition of commercial policy by holding that matters, such as financing and
the non-commercial effects of an international agreement, may also be
covered by article 113, so long as those matters are subsidiary to the overall commercial objective of the agreement and the agreement is a "characteristic measure" for trade regulation. This conclusion, the Court stated,
must naturally flow from the complex interaction of trade and politics in
today's world, and from the impact of a consolidated then nine-nation
economic unit at world trade negotiations.90 The Court's realistic view of

87. Id. at 8779. The Court stated: "Having regard to the fact that the essential object of
the agreement envisaged is to stabilize prices for natural rubber, this appears to be a characteristic measure for regulating external trade and thus an instrument of commerical policy." (emphases added). See Steenbergen, The Common Commercial Policy, 17 COMMON
cepted the Council's definition of article 113 while leaving the door open to use the Commission's criterion as well. Actually, it appears that in one sentence the Court accepted both the
Council's criterion and the Commission's.
88. Opinion 1/78, COMMON MKT. REP. 8600, at 8783.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 8782-83.
The Court takes the view that the fact that the agreement may cover subjects
such as technological assistance, research programs, labour conditions in the
industry concerned or consultations relating to national tax policies which may
have an effect on the price of rubber cannot modify the description of the
agreement which must be assessed having regard to its essential objective
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the changing nature of the measures used to control world trade and of
the problem of non-tariff barriers is demonstrated by its holding that
"mere liberalization of trade was not the only commercial purpose behind
the foundation of the Community nor the only instrument of achieving
the Community's commercial objectives.""
With this opinion the Court has brought the Community forward
into the realm of situational models 5 and 6. Internal powers that are not
expressed, but ancillary to or implied from the expressed objectives of the
Treaty can be enacted as well as can their implied external counterparts.
The case stands as the farthest reaching construction of the Community's
ability to act externally with a treaty-making power. In the interpretation
of this power, both with regard to the implication of its existence and the
limits on its use, the Court acted in the finest tradition of a constitutional
court. It attempts to give the Community the flexibility necessary to
achieve its objectives by means adapted to a changing international
environment. 91
Finally, the Court followed Opinion No. 1/75 regarding the issue of
delineation between articles 113 and 116 when the EEC is involved in
international economic negotiations. When the EEC negotiates an agreement that will have binding force in international law and the EEC is
recognized as an entity subject to international law, article 116 procedure
will not apply to those negotiations. 9
Also, the Court restated its previous stand on Member State participation in international agreements. Once the subject matter of the proposed agreement is found to be within the scope of the Community's
power, this power to act externally is exclusive."
V.

A

SUMMARY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

CASE LAW ON

EEC TREATY MAKING

The following list is a summary of the major points of law resulting
from the European Court's interpretation of the Community's external
power:
1. The power of the Community to bind itself under international law
flows from the implied and inherent powers of the Community as created
by the Treaty of Rome;
rather than in terms of individual clauses of an altogether subsidiary or ancillary nature.
91. Id. at 8781.
92. For example, if concurrent external powers were permitted and one of the Member
States failed to become a signatory to the international buffer stock agreement, that country
could easily defeat the purpose of the agreement by importing the goods cheaply through its
national ports and then redistributing the same goods to other Member States at cut-rate
prices. Since no intra-Community customs barriers exist, one state could force the prices
down below the internationally agreed stability price.
93. Id. at 8782.
94. Id. at 8783.
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2. The scope of this external power is not limited by the fact that no
internal rules on that subject matter have been adopted or that no specific grant of external power was mentioned in the Treaty;
3. Community powers in external matters are exclusive, and Member
States may participate in an agreement via a mixed procedure only if
there are unique circumstances;
4. The Community can delegate certain of its managerial powers to
international bodies to the same degree a Member State may do so;
5. Whenever a binding international agreement is involved and the
Community negotiates with an international economic organization as a
recognized legal entity, article 113 rather than article 116 applies;
6. Both the objective of a proposed agreement and the character of
the agreement as an instrument for regulating international trade are factors in deciding whether the agreement falls within the scope of commercial policy under article 113. The objectives and methods of such an
agreement need not concern traditional trade liberalization to fall within
the scope of article 113;
7. Noncommercial measures may be included in proposed commercial
agreements if they are subsidiary or ancillary to the objective of the proposed agreement;
8. Resort to the Court through article 228 is the correct method for
determining the exclusive power of the Community, under the Treaty, to
ratify a proposed agreement as well as to decide questions of power, procedure, and organization of Community institutions;
9. The Court's competence under article 228 is not limited by the
fact that a proposed agreement is still in the negotiating stage as long as
the final agreement will be binding. This is especially true in the case of
Community powers involving a relationship with non-Member countries.
A primary issue that remains unresolved is exactly how far the Court
has expanded the scope of the Community's power beyond the subsidiary
and ancillary non-commercial measures permitted in Opinion No. 1/78.
The question also remains whether subsidiary and ancillary measures will
be permitted in transport and other areas.
As noted previously, the Court has gone beyond the "in foro interno,
in foro externo" adage as a limitation on the scope of Community power.
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that the rationale behind the Commission's argument for an expanded definition of commercial policy continues to be the need to avoid exercise of extensive national powers by
Member States that will lead to conflicts between internal and external
policy.' 5

95. Steenbergen, supra note 87, at 234-35. Steenbergen points out the problem of interpreting external economic relations as belonging to the field of Community powers alone:
"[N]either Treaty provisions nor the case-law of the Court justifies such as extreme construction of Community power beyond the scope of a commercial policy ...." Further-
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The opinions of the Court taken as a whole, however, do not seem to
limit themselves to the above narrow legal interpretation of the possible
scope of external Community power. There is a definite and much wider
interpretation which includes exclusive Community power over all external economic relations of Member States regardless of the present stage
of development of intra-Community matters. It appears from the case law
that the Court has moved toward the creation of a legal basis for external
agreements that are not limited by the development of intra-Community
policy. The legal basis for such external power is to be found in the general principles and objectives upon which the Community was founded as
well as in the Community's international legal personality.
The tenor of the Court's opinions in this area reflects the Court's
desire to create an atmosphere for the growth of an external policy that
will permit a wide variety of external agreements. This growth is not to
be limited by failing to mention the subject matter of the agreement
within the Treaty or by theories of parallelism and "in foro interno, in
foro externo." When it has been possible to use these latter theories to
expand the external powers of the Community, the Court has made reference to them, but it has also pointed out that they were not to be a limitation on the scope of Community power.
Practical political necessity being what it is, it is likely that the Commission will have to present its argument to increase the scope of the
Community power in terms that avoid internal v. external policy conflicts.
There are also the political problems that must be solved internally
before agreement can be reached on any coordinated common external
policy. Thus, practical politics may force the Commission to wait until
common internal rules are agreed upon before negotiating an external
agreement. All of this, of course, evokes memories of the "functionalism"
theory of the Advocate-General in In re Kramer. Nevertheless, it is unfair
to dismiss the wider interpretation of the Court's opinions when the
Court presently has clearly placed no limits on the scope of Community
power over external affairs provided the subject matter of any proposed
agreement clearly reflects an attempt to achieve a treaty objective."
VI.

THE TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE IN PRACTICE

As mentioned in Section II, the Council has constantly attempted to
enforce a unanimity rule and to keep to itself any discretionary decision
making over the compatibility of international agreements with the
Treaty of Rome. The main legal arguments used by the Council have cen-

more, the phrase "in foro interno, in foro externo," coined by Judge Pescatore, can be interpreted to extend the power of the Community, under article 113, "as far as, but not beyond
the Community powers as defined according to the rules applied to the implied powers."
96. For the Commission's view on the external powers of the Community as a result of
the cases and opinions of the European Court, see Supplementary Answer to Written Question No. 173/77 on the Community's External Powers and Activities, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM.
(No. C 72) 1 (1978).
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tered on articles 238, 228 and 113. The Council has defined the substantive coverage of article 238 very narrowly. Rather than considering that
article 238 gives the Community power to conclude broad agreements encompassing all subjects over which the Treaty of Rome gives the Community internal competence, the Council has considered "association" agreements to be the same as the trade and tariff agreements of articles 111
and 113. Article 238 is also considered as containing the only procedure
for implementing those agreements. The effect of this interpretation has
been an attempt by the Council to subject all agreements, except the
most narrowly defined trade and tariff agreements, to the unanimous voting requirements of article 238, without referring them beforehand to the
Court of Justice, as envisaged in article 228. It permits the Council to
decide when an agreement might exceed Community treaty-making
power and when to resort to article 236.
The problem with this approach by the Council is that it becomes
necessary to explain away the fact that article 113 has a majority voting
procedure, whereas article 238, setting forth the amendment process, is
unanimous and requires Parliamentary consultation. 97 Why would the
provisions of article 238 have greater safeguards than article 113 if the
scope of the types of agreements covered by both articles is considered
coextensive? The answer the Council provides permits the use of majority
voting only for the most narrow trade and tariff provisions. Any wider
provisions even in the commercial area are voted on by the Council
through article 238's unanimous procedure.9"
The Council further limits the Community's power by often insisting,
when resorting to article 238, that parts of a proposed agreement exceed
the powers of the Community." In effect, the Council avoids article 238
entirely and acts as the Court of Justice should under article 228(1). The
Council engages in a legal interpretation of the Treaty of Rome and decides upon the compatibility of the agreement with the Treaty. Once it
decides that the Community is powerless under the Treaty to conclude a
given part of the proposed agreement, the Council resorts to the amendment process in article 236.
According to the Council the power to conclude an agreement which
exceeds Community power is acquired by the use of the "mixed procedure."10 0 Under this procedure both Member States and Community participate in the signing and ratification of the agreement. Once the Council
determines that parts of a proposed agreement exceed t.e competence of
the Community institutions, the Member States must sign and ratify the
97. Costonis, supra note 9, at 444-49. Costonis describes the legislative history of article
238 and concludes that powers well beyond articles 111 and 113 were intended for article
238.
98. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, art. 238.
99. Costonis, supra note 9, at 443-48.
100. Costonis, supra note 9, at 449-50; Leopold, supra note 8, at 62-65; Norton, supra
note 9, at 594-97.
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agreement according to their respective national procedures. The Council
approves the agreement when all Member States have ratified it. The
Council asserts that this procedure satisfies the requirements of articles
228 and 236 for amending the Treaty. In other words, the Council considers each association agreement to be an amendment of the Treaty for the
purposes of that association agreement only.
The most serious problem with this mixed procedure is the failure of
the Council to identify which parts of a proposed agreement exceed the
Community powers. This permits the Member States to consider all parts
of the proposed agreement according to their national procedures during
ratification, thus possibly vetoing a proposed agreement when the objectionable provisions are actually those of Community competence only. If
the Court decided which parts of a proposed agreement exceeded Community power, then the procedure of article 235 could be resorted to in
order to increase Community power for that particular agreement, or article 236 could be resorted to for an amendment that would cover all future
agreements in that area. The latter procedure would be more in line with
a true amendment process.
The above techniques have been used by the Council to undermine
Community power and have evoked considerable comment."'1 The Political Committee of the European Assembly insists that the meaning of "association" under article 238 includes substantive arrangements beyond
mere tariff and trade agreements.'
Since the Council apparently does not want to permit the Community to sign a "pure" Community agreement unless that agreement is limited strictly to the subject matter of article 113, the development of the
mixed procedure can be said to reflect the political realities of power
within the Community.0 " It also provides a somewhat practical solution
until those political problems limiting further movement toward suprana-

101. Norton, supra note 9, at 595-96. Norton says:
Great difficulties inevitably arise in trying to make some legal sense out of the
'mixed procedure' system. . . . By use of the 'mixed procedure' the Council of
Ministers has by passed the intended role of the Court of Justice, a violation of
the Treaty of Rome which the Commission has been reluctant to press before
the Court of Justice.
102. Id. at 597-98, quoting from the Birkelbach Report and P. Pescatore, Les Relations
Exterieures des Communautgs Europ~ennes, 103 RECUEIL DES COURT DE L'ACADEMIE DE
Daorr INTERNATIONAL 1 (1961).
103. The mixed procedure has been used on the International Coffee Agreement of
1976 ([19761 19 J.O. COMM. EUR. L 309/28); the International Cocoa Agreement of 1975
([1976] 19 J.O. COMM. EUR. L 321/29); Fifth International Tin Agreement, 1975 ([1976] 19
J.O. COMM. EUR. L 222/1); the International Cocoa Agreement of 1973 ([1973] 16 J.O. COMM.
EUR. L 324/20); Fourth International Tin Agreement, 1971 ([1972] 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. L 90/
2); International Wheat Agreement of 1971, 22 U.S.T. 821, T.I.A.S. No. 7144; and the Long
Term Arrangement for Cotton Textiles ([1970] 13 J.O. CoMm. EUR. 1225/29). As of 1977, all
association agreements except those with Tunisia and Morocco in 1969, Malta in 1970, and
Cyprus in 1972, were concluded by the mixed procedure. These non-mixed procedure agreements, however, dealt solely with matters falling with in article 113.
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tionality can be resolved.
The ultimate elimination of the mixed procedure system in practice
as well as in theory is necessary if the Community will ever truly possess
competence as a distinct international entity capable of concluding international contracts on its own. Under the "pure" Community agreement
procedure the Member States are automatically bound. Therefore, even
though it may seem there is little difference in practical effect between
resort to individual Member State ratification and an approval by the
same state's ministers on the Council, the legal distinction is enormous.
Bypassing Member State ratification and making Community agreements
automatically binding within the Member States is a step toward
supranationality.
Finally, the Council has used two procedural techniques to further
restrict Community autonomy. First, under articles 238 and 228, the
Council issues a negotiating mandate for the Commission.", The Commission should then conduct the negotiations independently and present
its final proposal for Council approval or rejection. In practice, the Council has insisted upon the presence of "national observers" in the negotiating stage of association agreements.'0 5 Some coordination between the
Council and the Commission was envisaged in article 113 for trade and
tariff negotiations, but not for other agreements. 06 The Council transposed controls written into article 113 over to article 238. Since article
238 already modifies the general treaty-making procedures of article 228
by requiring Parliamentary consultation as well as unanimous voting,
these additional controls are hardly necessary. The national observers
may help gain later Council approval for an agreement, but that is hardly
justification for their interference in the negotiating process. In truth, the
presence of "national observers" indicates the Council's unwillingness to
07
lose control over any aspect of the treaty-making process.1
Second, the Council has ignored the consultative rights of the European Parliament as required by article 238 association agreements.10 8 In
the past, the Council consulted the Parliament after the Council had already signed the proposed agreement. Thus, any productive suggestions
for change that might have been made by the Parliament could not have
been implemented without the Council changing what had already be-

ret,
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7oe supra

not

1,

ars
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105. For a general discussion, see Bot, Negotiating Community Agreements: Procedure
and Practice, 7 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 286 (1970); Costonis, supra note 9, at 429-39; Hallstein, The EEC Commission: A New Factor in InternationalLife, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
727, 739 (1965); Leopold, supra note 8, at 65-66.
106. Bot, supra note 105, at 306; Hallstein, supra note 108, at 739.
107. Bot, supra note 105, at 309; Hallstein, supra note 108, at 739.
108. Rome Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 228(1), 113, 238. Article 228(1) states that Parliamentary consultation is necessary only where required by the Treaty. Article 113 agreements do not require Parliamentary consultation. Article 238 associations require Parliamentary consultation. See generally Costonis, supra note 9, at 438-42, and Leopold, supra
note 8, at 66-67.
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come an international contract. While the Parliament is now informed of
the contents of proposed agreements before they are signed, formal consultation with the Parliament still takes place after Council signature
under the "Luns" procedure." 9 The merits of an extensive prior consultation with the Parliament might be argued, but the fact remains that the
present procedures are another indication of Council control over the
treaty-making process.
As demonstrated by this article, all the above procedural methods
have resulted in some substantive changes in the guidelines announced by
the European Court regarding the treaty-making process. Of course, the
factors motivating these procedural changes are political. Like the common law process, when the substantive changes cannot be made because
of political reasons, the procedures are adjusted or distorted in order to
permit the system to function. Hopefully, political solutions will be
reached soon so that treaty-making procedures will be in harmony with
the Court's decisions. Otherwise, a long-term distortion of the procedural
process may result in permanent institutional change. A current study of
treaty-making procedures is needed in order to assess the impact of the
more recent opinions of the Court of Justice.
VII.

PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT STATUS OF
TREATY MAKING FOR NON-MEMBER STATES

EEC

Other than the obvious intra-Community struggle between the Commission and the Council which is reflected in the differences between the
theory of treaty making as viewed by the European Court and its actual
practice, there are some serious problem areas with the present status of
the EEC treaty power vis-a-vis non-Member countries. For example, what
happens in a mixed procedure agreement if a Member State decides to
denounce its obligations? Obviously, it is still bound to fulfill its Community obligations if the Community is a legally bound contracting party,
but who determines which obligations are those of the Community and
which obligations are those of the individual Member States? If this latter question is not resolved when the agreement is negotiated, then the
non-Member State may find the agreement being submitted to the European Court for such a determination. As noted in Opinion No. 1/78, the
European Court mentioned that it was aware of the problem for a nonMember State or a third party when they become involved in a mixed
procedure agreement with the Community. Justice Pescatore has written
that even though the Court has shown sensitivity towards allowing third
parties to negotiate agreements with the Community, no third state
would be allowed to intervene in the internal affairs of the Community or
in the delicate relationship between the Community and its Member

109. Bersani Report, FURO. PA^L. SER. 226, Manu. 1967. See also 1972-1973 EUR. PARL.
Doc. (No. 226) 5 (1972) & (No. 300) 5 (1972) for resolutions by Parliament calling for
greater consultation rights.
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States.'" Thus, to avoid involvement in a European Court dispute, the
third party to an agreement must have these questions of delineation between Community responsibility and Member State responsibility determined initially in the agreement itself.
Delineating responsibilities has posed a major drafting and negotiating problem for non-Member States. When a non-Member State attempts
to draft an international agreement in which both the Community and its
Member States have areas of responsibility, two problems become apparent. First, it is impossible to list all of the powers and responsibilities of
the Community. Second, it is often difficult to outline the relationship
between the Community and Member States. The Community is a dynamic, evolving, and growing organization. An increase in its internal
powers will certainly result in a shifting of external responsibilities within
an international agreement from the signatory Member States to the signatory Community. The European Court has discussed this shift of responsibility within the context of an international agreement and organization with reference to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(G.A.T.'T.). The Court has concluded that since the Community has assumed the powers in the area governed by the G.A.T.T. which were previously exercised by the Member States, the provisions of the agreement
bind the Community."' Only the European Court of Justice can determine whether the Community or Member State is bound at any given
time by a specific obligation." 2

110. Pescatore, supra note 36, at 627. The Justice states:
[I]t may be said that, on the one hand, the Court has shown itself to be sensitive toward the legitimate interests of third parties involved in the process of
negotiating agreements with the Community.- But at the same time, it would
not allow any intervention by Third States in internal matters of the Community, and, more particularly, in the determination of the very complex and delicate relationship between the Community and its own Member States.
111. International Fruit Company NV v. Produktschap voor groenten en fruit, 1972 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 2 Common Mkt. L. R. 1 (1972), [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8194 (1975) (Eur. Ct. of Justice, Joined Cases Nos. 21 to 24/72). See also
Kapteyn, The Domestic Law Effect of Rules of International Law Within the European
Community System of Law and the Question of the Self-Executing Character of GATT
Rules, 8 INT'L L. 74 (1974); Riesenfeld, The Doctrineof Self-Executing Treaties and Community Law: A Pioneer Decision of the Court of Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 504 (1973);
Waelbroeck, Effect of GATT Within the Legal Order of the EEC, 8 J. WORLD TRANSNAT'L
Lu.614tA
..........j -1,uCurL tate
Since the entry into force of the EEC Treaty and more particularly, since the
setting up of the common external tariff, the transfer of powers which has occurred in the relations between Member States and the Community has been
put into concrete form in different ways within the framework of the General
Agreement and has been recognized by the other Contracting Parties. . . . [I]t
therefore appears that, insofar as under the EEC Treaty the Community has
assumed the powers previously exercised by Member States in the area governed by the General Agreement, the provisions of that agreement have the
effect of binding the Community.
112. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is perhaps a
good practical case for examination of the drafting problem. The draft assimilation clause
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Perhaps the best a third-party state signatory can hope for in a
mixed procedure agreement with the Community, is a listing in the agreement of those areas of responsibility which European case law has up to
that point clearly established as belonging exclusively to the Community.
In addition, a provision for Community notification to signatories when it
has clearly accepted responsibility for new areas could be added. This
latter proposal might encounter resistance in areas which, for internal political reasons, both the Community and Member States would prefer
that responsibilities between themselves be kept nebulous."'
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The major problem confronting the Community with respect to its
treaty-making power continues to be the conflict between the progressive
and forward-looking evolution of the treaty-making power as espoused by
the European Court, and the practical application of that power. This
conflict is the result of the continuing political struggle between Commission and Council. Increasingly, the advancement of Community policies is
dependent upon the resolution of intra-Community political disagreements. This trend became inevitable once the purely economic issues

were coordinated and resolved. The issues left to be resolved are not
nearly so divisible into "pure" economic or "pure" political categories.
The multi-lateralization of trade and the growth of economic organizations and coordinating committees has not made the Community's
problems any easier. As the intra-Community political climate approaches the European Court's interpretation of the treaty-making
power, the effects of the Court's decisions will begin to be felt in all areas,
not just in commerce or transport.

for the EEC reads as follows:
Customs unions, communities or other regional economic integration groupings
referred to in paragraph 1, shall, upon deposit of their instruments of approval
or accession, become Contracting Parties with the same rights and obligations
as State Parties under the provisions of the Convention to the extent that
these rights and obligations relate to an area where powers have been given to
them by their Member States. (emphasis added).
While the above proposed clause permits the dynamic growth of the Community to
proceed unimpaired by a multilateral agreement, the position of the non-Member signatory
state has not changed. In the new Law of the Sea Treaty, some subject areas are under the
control of Member States and some matters belong to the Community. Since the responsibility for many subject areas is in transition, simple divisions of responsibility along territorial lines will not work. UN Doc. A/Conf. 62/L. 32 (Sept. 14, 1978). For discussions on the
EEC and the UNCLOS problem, see Koers, Participationof the European Economic Community in a New Law of the Sea Convention, 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 426 (1979); Oxman, Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session, 74 Am. J. INT'L L.
1, 40-42 (1980); Vignes, The EEC and the Law of the Sea, reprinted in 3 NEW DmECTIoNs
IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 335, 339 (1973).
113. An example of tlis type of approach might be seen in the U.S.S.R.'s informal proposal at the UNCLOS conference. Conf. Doc. FC/3 (July 30, 1979), discussed in Oxman,
supra note 112, at 40 n.148.
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The case law of the Court indicates that the Court is bestowing on
the Community an increased treaty-making power. Writers disagree as to
whether the Court's cases should be interpreted narrowly or broadly, but
they agree that the Court is leading both the Council and, at times, the
Commission, toward the practical application of a treaty-making power
that permits the Community to act as a fully independent international
legal personality. The Court's judgments have at times been "prospective," as in Commission v. Council and Kramer, but the law established
in these cases is being followed gradually. The exclusive nature of the
Community's power under article 113 is no longer challenged. Instead,
arguments have shifted to whether the proposed agreement falls within
article 113. Also, the Council must seek to justify a mixed procedure
agreement on the grounds that some of the responsibilities to be undertaken in the proposal still belong to the Member States. Concurrent powers are recognized as non-existent for both Community and Member
States.
Nevertheless, the Commission and Council continue to use the powers given to them by the Court with restraint, although for different reasons. A new survey of treaty making in practice, much like the interviews
conducted by Mr. Costonis in the 1960's and discussed partially in part
VI of this paper, needs to be undertaken to see how many tactics used by
the Council to control the treaty-making practice are still in effect. This
writer suspects that most of the tactics are still used, and that while a
purely Community agreement may no longer be signed by a mixed procedure process, the use of "national observers" at the negotiating table has
continued to give the Council a powerful handle by which to control the
treaty-making process.
Since so much of the future of the integration process in Western
Europe is becoming dependent upon the resolution of intra-Community
political disputes, the future of the process and hence the possibilities for
the Community to exercise its treaty-making powers to their fullest potential will depend on the political climate. Traditionally, the stimulus to
centralize power has come from an external threat such as invasion and
the corresponding need for a centralized defense. This stimulus has been
lacking in Western Europe, but there are signs that this situation may be
changing.
Second, a favorable political climate is expected to develop in the
foreign policy area. The Report on European Union by Leo Tindemans1 4
urged the Community to create a united foreign policy front based on a
common policy rather than on simple inter-governmental coordination.
Any movement away from consensus opinions and toward majority voting
in the foreign policy area should be watched as auguring a potential for
increased use of the treaty-making power in new fields."'

114. Bull., EC Suppl. 1/76.
115. See Resolution of the European Parliament on European Political Cooperation, 21
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A third area with potential for creating the political climate necessary for full use of the treaty-making power is the commercial area itself.
The Japanese are increasingly invading traditional Western European industrial areas such as automobile, watch, shipbuilding, steel and textile
interests. The Member States may find that the only effective way to
counter this invasion will be through action on the Community level.
Their eagerness to avoid the internal social changes resulting from Japanese competition may prove to outweigh any reluctance to argue over increased exercise of centralized Community powers in external affairs.
While these areas favor the creation of the political climate and stimulus necessary for the Community to expand its treaty-making practice to
the fullest extent envisaged by the European Court, it is important not to
be overly optimistic. Political climates are no more predictable and
maybe even less predictable than the meteorological climate. However,
the political sensitivity of external affairs and treaties will continue to
make the evolution of Community treaty-making power an area in which
the Community integration process can be measured both theoretically
and practically.

O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 36) 32 (1978). For a positive comment on the progress toward European political cooperation Pnd foreign policy coordination, see Gablentz, Luxembourg Revisited or the Importance of European PoliticalCooperation, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 685
(1979).

